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Abstract
Australian policies to preserve native vegetation on farms rest on mandatory
regulations without compensation, whereas policies in most OECD countries rest on
voluntary conservation with compensation.  In New South Wales, the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1998 restricts farmers from clearing native vegetation
on their own freehold land, and offers no compensation.  The Act may therefore
impose opportunity costs, or losses in income, on landholders.  These opportunity
costs are estimated for a case study property in the Hunter Valley of New South
Wales, and these results are then generalised to assess the broad trade-offs between
development and preservation.  The losses in income appear to vary between 5 and 10
per cent of annual income, depending on livestock prices.  The flow of these losses
over time appears to total some $26m for all properties of this kind in the immediate
region.  In addition to imposition of these direct opportunity costs, the regulations
hinder land sales and so hinder adjustment by landholders to changing conditions.
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Economic impacts of regulations to preserve native woodland on private
property: a case study in the Hunter Valley of New South Wales
Introduction
The Commonwealth government is committed to the principle of ecologically sustainable
development, which it defines as follows (Commonwealth of Australia 1990).
“Using, conserving, and enhancing the community’s resources so that ecological
processes on which life depends, are maintained, and that the total quality of life,
now and in the future, can be increased”
The responsibilities for implementing the principle are shared by all governments.  The
Commonwealth uses its export powers, investment powers and commitments to international
agreements, to pursue this goal.  Under the Australian Constitution, the states also have a
responsibility for protecting the environment.  State governments typically manage state forests
and national parks, and regulate pollution and waste disposal.  In this role, the New South Wales
government recently introduced regulations to prevent clearance of native woodland on freehold
land.
The Native Vegetation Conservation Act was implemented on 1st January 1998, to
protect, improve and increase the area of native vegetation in New South Wales.  In essence, the
Act prevents clearing of native vegetation on private land although it does permit some specified
clearing without the need for approval and some subject to approval.  The Act will therefore lead
to opportunity costs, or losses in income, for farmers who wish to clear.
There are many economic issues associated with this kind of attempt to promote
ecologically-sustainable development through preservation of woodland on farms.  For example,
how large are the opportunity costs, what sort of farm bears them, and what kinds of situation
lead to high and low opportunity costs?  The objectives of this paper are therefore (a) to assess
the size and distribution of the costs that the Act may impose, (b) to assess the nature of the
general trade-offs of income for retention of woodland, and (c) to explore policies to achieve the
goal of ecologically sustainable development at lower costs to the farming community.  These
objectives are pursued by an analysis of the economic impacts of the Act on a typical property in
the Hunter Valley of New South Wales, and by an extension of the analysis to examine the
general trade-offs between development for agriculture and preservation of woodland.4
Economic principles and land use
The debates on the preservation of woodland turn on the issues of market failure and
resource pricing, as do most discussions of environmental issues.  We now consider each of
these in turn.
The issues of market failure
The use of land for agricultural purposes produces both agricultural commodities and
environmental amenities.  The commodities are exclusive goods, because one consumer can
exclude another from consumption, and rival, because the consumption of additional amounts
involves additional marginal costs of production. These goods are exchanged in competitive
markets. The same use of agricultural land also produces environmental amenities that are non-
exclusive and non-rival.  One consumer of the amenity cannot exclude another, and increases in
consumption do not necessarily require additional expenditures on production.  These amenities
are public goods, that  are not exchanged in any kind of market.
The existence of jointly-produced private and public goods raises issues of differences in
the incidence of benefits and costs.  The full market benefits from the agricultural commodity
tend to fall on the producer, but the benefits of the amenity tend to fall on the community at
large.  Inevitably then an increase in agricultural production through clearing of woodland will
lead to external costs that fall on the community and perhaps to a net loss in welfare.
The optimal combination of commodities and amenities could still be identified, but the
market will fail to produce it and will operate where the landholder maximises his own income.
Attainment of the social optimum turns on the level of consumption of the agricultural
commodity, the elasticity of substitution in production between the commodity and the service,
and the implementation of pricing/payment policies to charge beneficiaries and reward the
producers of the amenities.
The issues of pricing
We now turn to the principles for pricing that may be used to resolve environmental problems
that concern the supply of environmental amenities from farmland.  
The polluter-pays principle implies that producers should pay some, if not all, of the costs
associated with any pollution or disamenity that they produce.  Similarly, producers should be
compensated for any external benefits that they produce.  The principle has been used widely in the5
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, yet the polluter’s responsibilities are still
debated.  For example, should polluters pay for all of the damage costs associated with the socially-
desired level of emissions?  Or should they pay only for the cost of reducing emissions to socially-
desirable levels?
In many countries, the agricultural sector has been relatively exempt from paying for the pollution
that it causes because the discharges tend to be non-point and stochastic.
Suppose that the farmer foregoes the right he already has to clear the woodland.  He decreases his
profits but improves the output of environmental amenities. Should he be compensated for his lost
profits? The farmer is taking action to reduce negative externalities, so a priori  the polluter-pays
principle is applicable and he should be compensated.
The beneficiaries-pay principle requires that those who benefit pay the full marginal costs for the
service or amenity.  The principle implies:
• that those who benefit from public goods, such as hunters, or day-trippers to scenic rural areas,
should pay a fee to the providers of the good,
• that these payments compensate farmers for providing the public good and hence cover their
opportunity costs from changing land uses to increase production of amenity services, and
• that the interaction of marginal willingness to pay (demand) and opportunity cost (supply) will
result in an efficient level of public good provision.
  Application of this principle becomes complicated, because of the physical, legal and cultural
difficulties of excluding non-paying beneficiaries of the public good amenities. There are also
problems with the likely supply of the so-called public-good amenities such as viewing ‘traditional’
farm landscapes. The likely supply of these amenities would be too small and inefficient if they were
determined by the beneficiaries-pay-principle.
The provider-gets principle is based more on supply than demand. The government must determine
the ‘appropriate’ quantity of the amenities, and then direct public funds to the provider’s of them
according to the marginal opportunity costs of supply.  For example, farmers have been subsidised to
reduce such things as fertiliser emissions from the use of nitrogen fertilisers in the United Kingdom.
The major advantage of this principle over the beneficiaries-pay principle is that it avoids the
problem of having to identify the beneficiaries. Nevertheless. the provider-gets principle requires
that:
· suppliers of the amenities can be identified,6
· funds can be transferred to them,
· funding is available for  the transfers, and
· appropriate levels of supply can be identified.
Application Hanley et al (1995) studied policies for the supply of environmental amenities from
farmland in nine OECD countries. They found that a large proportion of the countries used the
provider-gets principle in the provision of public goods from agriculture and rural land use in general,
but few were using the beneficiaries-pay principle.
In several countries, governments offer payments to the farmer to supply public, environmental
goods. To obtain these payments, farmers must follow certain guidelines and restrictions, as for
example, reductions in herbicide use, maintenance of stone walls, and establishment of broad-leaved
woodland plantations. Some of the schemes include:
•   the North American Water-fowl Management Plan, funded by U.S. and Canadian taxpayers,
•  the National Fund for the Protection of Rural Landscapes in Switzerland. Similar schemes exist in
Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands and Austria.
•  the Environmentally Sensitive Areas scheme and management agreements under the Wildlife and
Countryside Act in the U.K, and
•   the changes occurring in the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union. These are
moving away from crop price support schemes to more direct income support, like the Arable Areas
Payment Scheme.
Method and Data Collection
Farmers typically have many land use enterprises to choose from, and many constraints
to work within.  The constraints include the areas of different types of land, and the limits on
operating budgets and capital budgets.  Farmers tend to choose enterprises to maximise annual
profit subject to the constraints, and to define the profit (or gross margin) per enterprise as gross
returns minus variable costs of production. Linear programming models this kind of decision and
so was used to estimate the opportunity costs for the case study property.  The method is
described statistically in Appendix 1. In essence, it selects the combination of enterprises, and
the amount of each, that maximise profit and meet all the constraints.
The data for the technique comprise technical and economic descriptions of the
constraints, and the way the resources of land, labour, and capital can be used in the various7
enterprises to produce outputs.  Constraints on the land uses can model regulations to prevent
clearing of the woodland to achieve ecologically-sustainable farming.  In simple terms, the total
farm income or gross margin can be calculated with and without constraints on clearing and the
loss of income is the opportunity cost of the restrictions on clearing.
The case study property is situated on the slopes of Scone Shire in the Hunter Valley of New
South Wales.  It is approximately 810 hectares in size, with six different land types (40 ha of river
flats, 120 ha of highly improved native pasture, 320 of improved native pasture, 50 of native pasture,
230 ha of woodland, and 50 ha of very steep/rough country). The land types are described in detail in
Appendix 2.  The main category of concern is the 230 ha of woodland, which comprises 28 per cent
of the property.  The case study farm is typical of other properties in the region, with its large
proportion of relatively-untouched native woodland, which is directly affected by the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act.
Data on the land types, yields, prices, and costs of the farm enterprises were collected from a
range of sources including, Department of Land and Water Conservation, New South Wales Farmers
Association, The Land newspaper, Scone Shire Council, and the owner of the case study property.
The two main income-earning enterprises were raising cattle to sell as yearlings, and selling
wool from a wether flock (Table 1, with details in Appendix 2). The gross margins for each
enterprise were calculated from the farm’s records for the period 1989 – 1998, to represent the prices
of ‘good’, ‘average’ and ‘poor’ years. These margins were calculated from the maximum, average
and minimum prices, respectively, over that period. The landholder runs sheep and cattle at an
approximate ratio of 10 sheep to 1 cow, to reduce the problems of uncertain prices.  This ratio was
therefore included as a constraint in the model to ensure that the quantities of these two livestock
enterprises meet this ratio.
The constraints on land areas and budgets, and a brief definition of each, are shown in Table
2.  The major constraints of interest are the areas of each type of woodland.  As the table shows, there
are three species, (white box, yellow box, and stringy bark), two slope categories (moderate and
steep) and two density classes (thick and thin) –- to give 12 woodland types in all.  Each of the 12
categories can be grazed in its present state, or cleared of timber and then grazed, or preserved with
no grazing at all.  There are therefore three enterprises per woodland type and a total of 36 for all
twelve woodland types as a whole.8
Two more constraints were included to reflect the farmer’s budget situation.  The first ensured
that the expenditure on all the variable costs were limited to amounts typically available in good,
average or poor years.  The second ensured that the capital expenditures, which cover the costs of
clearing the woodland, were constrained to amounts typically available.  In the basic runs, the total
available capital budget was set at $10 000.
Results: the case study
The linear programming model was first tested by comparing its predictions on stocking rates
with actual rates for the good, average and poor years. The predictions were always within 15 per
cent of observed levels, and so the model fits the problem well.  The model was then applied to
estimate the basic opportunity costs of the restrictions (Table 3), the effects of changes in livestock
prices and the restrictions (Table 4), the effects of different kinds of restrictions (Table 5), and the
effects of restrictions on the values of different land types (Table 6).
The basic opportunity costs
The basic results are the gross margins for the farm as a whole with no clearing restrictions at
all and with total clearing restrictions (Table 3). The gross margins were calculated for good, average
and poor years, each of which had its own price levels and budget for operating capital as detailed in
Appendix 2. The gross margin in a good year with no clearing restrictions was estimated to be $56
960 but the clearing restrictions lower this to $53 371. This difference or opportunity cost is $3 589
per year, which is 6.3 per cent of the annual gross margin. In an average year, the restrictions reduce
the annual gross margin by $2 439 or 7.2 per cent. In a poor year, the reduction is $1 994 or 10.5 per
cent. The landholder therefore bears higher opportunity cost in a poorer year, or more generally
perhaps poorer landholders bear proportionately higher losses in income.
The long term economic impact of the clearing restrictions can be measured by the net present
value of a stream of annual opportunity costs. The net present value is the difference between the
present value of benefits (PVB) and the present value of costs (PVC), and a present value is the
equivalent value today of a future benefit or cost (Sinden & Thampapillai, 1995). The landholder has
a 20 year time horizon, and can presently borrow capital for clearing and other farm purposes at 7 per9
cent.  With a 2 per cent inflation rate, the real rate of interest is 5 per cent.  The long-term impact of a
series of average years may therefore be estimated as follows.
NPV = PVB - PVC
= (present value of 2 439 for 20 years at 5 %) - clearing cost
         = (2 439 x 12.46) - 10 000
         = $30 390 - $10 000 = $20 390
There are some 210 properties in Scone Shire with the similar characteristics as the case study
property.  Hence, the opportunity cost (as a present value) for Scone Shire of these restrictions is $4
281 900. There are five adjacent shires (Murrurundi, Nundle, Walcha, Gloucester and Dungog) with
similar types of country, and so the opportunity cost of these restrictions for all these six areas put
together, could be in excess of $26 million.
The effects of changes in livestock prices and restrictions on clearing
Gross margins with no clearing restrictions and total clearing restrictions are shown in Table 4
for a (good year for cattle prices and poor year for sheep prices) and for a (poor year for cattle prices
and a good year for sheep prices).  The effect of the restrictions has been calculated by subtracting
the gross margin for ‘total restrictions’ from the gross margin for ‘no restrictions’. The effect of the
changes in livestock prices has been calculated by subtracting the gross margin for (good year-
sheep/poor year-cattle) from the gross margin for (good year-cattle/poor year-sheep), for both ‘no
restrictions’ and ‘total restrictions’. The prices for both livestock enterprises reflect trends over the
past nine years, when increases in the price of one enterprise have been accompanied by a decrease in
the price of the other.
These results show, as before, that clearing restrictions lower the annual income or total farm
gross margins.  They also show that on average, the land holder is better off with good sheep prices
and poor cattle prices ($36 613 or $34 080) rather than good cattle prices and poor sheep prices ($35
456 or $32 964) whether restrictions apply or not.  But the clearing restrictions have twice the effect
of livestock price differences on annual gross margin.
The effect of different kinds of clearing restrictions
Gross margins for the whole farm for an average year are shown in Table 5 for different types
of clearing restrictions.  The government may decide to let farmers clear a certain percentage of their
properties, hence the effect of 25, 50, 75 and 100 per cent restrictions are estimated.  Instead of this10
kind of blanket percentage restriction, the government may decide to restrict clearing on steeply-
sloped country or restrict clearing of certain types of woodland.
Restrictions on the clearance of stringy bark woodland reflect the fact that this species is
millable after a certain size. The logs can return up to $30-60 per cubic metre, depending on whether
the farmer harvests the trees himself or whether contractors are employed.  Clearance on steep
country could be restricted because the risk of erosion is greater than on moderate slopes.
Restrictions on the retention of white box woodland were not included because retention in this area
increases the chance of erosion where the trees grow close together. Further, white box has a high
water uptake and so poor water holding properties and so ecological reasons favour clearing white
box timber.
As expected, greater restrictions led to lower gross margins.  The annual income or gross
margin with no clearing restrictions is $33 952 and decreases gradually to $31 513 as the clearing
restrictions are increased.
The effect of clearing restrictions on land values
The values of a hectare of each land type, with and without restrictions, are given in Table 6.
These values show the maximum amount that the landholder could afford to pay for an extra hectare
of each type.  They have been calculated as the present value of a series of annual incomes that lasts
for 20 years, at an interest rate of 5 per cent. The following example, for clearing the thickly wooded,
white box areas on moderate slopes, will illustrate the calculation.  When cleared, this land will run
four sheep to the hectare.  The wool from one of these wethers returns $11 in an average year, the
cost of clearing the land is $56 per hectare, and the annual variable costs are $5 per cleared hectare.
The annual income, after clearing is therefore $39 per hectare.
Present value  = (39 x discount factor) - 56
= (39 x 12.46) -56
= $430.       
A farmer who wished to purchase moderately sloped country, that was thickly covered in white box
timber, could therefore pay up to $430/ha if there were no clearing restrictions. He could only pay
$168/ha if there were restrictions.
As can be seen from Table 6, clearing restrictions lower the value of timbered country by
more than half the value of what it is otherwise worth.  The restrictions therefore reduce the
landholder's ability to pay for more land to increase the size of a property.  Equally, they reduce the11
incentive for landholders to sell land.  Overall they reduce the ability of all landholders to adjust to
changing economic conditions.
Results: the general trade-offs
The results from the case study can be generalised to examine the broad issues of
restrictions on clearing of woodland on freehold farms to promote ecological sustainability.  The
general economic impact of the restrictions is a loss of income to the landholder, and the
estimated magnitudes of this trade-off may be summarised as follows.
• Losses to the individual producer in the case study were of the order of 6 to 11 per cent of annual
income.
• Losses over time, to all producers in similar situations in the surrounding region, may be of the
order of $26m.
• Low-income producers seem to bear proportionately higher costs than high-income producers.
• Restrictions hinder land sales.  Restrictions lower the potential returns of timbered country by more
than half the value of what they are otherwise worth. They therefore decrease the attractiveness of the
land to potential buyers and decrease its saleability for potential sellers.
There are diminishing returns to clearing the woodland, a result that we would expect to be
quite general. The losses in income so far have been calculated on the assumption that landholders
have $10 000 of capital to invest in clearing.  The annual gross margins (GM) per farm are now
calculated for three further amounts of investment capital, namely $0, $3 000, and $6 000, and for an
average year. The net returns to clearing can be calculated as the ratio of the present value of returns
to the present value of costs.  This ratio was calculated for a 20-year flow of extra gross margins, for
the three real capital levels, at a real interest rate of 5 per cent, and for average prices and average
operating capital. The full set of results is as follows.
Capital Gross Extra Extra Benefit-cost Percentage
($) margin($) GM ($) GM (%)  ratio cleared
0 31 513 0 0 na 0
3 000 32 545 1 032 3.3 4.3 44
6 000 33 162 1 649 5.2 3.4 67
10 000 33 952 2 439 7.7 3.0 9812
With no capital available for clearing, the gross margin for the whole farm will be $31 513.
With just $3 000 of capital, an annual gross margin of  $32 545 can be achieved (an extra 3.3 per
cent).  With the full $10 000, a gross margin of $33 952 can be achieved (an extra 7.7 per cent).  The
benefit-cost ratio from the investment of $3 000 is 4.3, from $6 000 it is 3.4, and from $10 000 it is
3.0.  Clearly the profitability of extra investment in clearing is decreasing, although each dollar
invested still earns $3 in returns even when 98 per cent of the woodland is cleared. The income to the
landholder varies directly with the capital available, and with the level of the restrictions.  The results
also show that more capital is associated with more clearing.  Indeed, the percentage of woodland
that would be cleared varies directly with the amount of investment capital that is available.
 The results above show the general nature of the trade-offs -- the loss of income to the
landholder increases with increases in the amount of available capital are available.  But the loss also
increases when higher levels of restrictions are imposed.  Consider the above results again. If the
regulations allow all clearing, there is a 7.7 per cent increase in income. If they allow 67 per cent to
be cleared, there is a 5.2 per cent increase in income.  If the regulations allow only 44 per cent to be
cleared, there is only a 3.3 per cent increase in income.  The results of Table 5 show the same kinds
of trade-offs when a given amount of capital is available -- the loss of income to the landholder
increases with higher levels of restrictions.
There may also be diminishing ecological returns to preservation, although an economic
analysis can only suggest this possibility. The case study farm is likely to typify many situations
where a property has several types of woodland.  The types can be expected to vary in their
ecological importance and perhaps woodland on steeper slopes is of more ecological importance than
woodland on moderate slopes, and thick or densely-stocked woodland is more important than thin.
For example, thick yellow box on steep slopes may be of more ecological importance than thin
yellow box on moderate slopes.  If so, the ecological returns to preserving woodland decline as the
most important areas are preserved first, and there may be reasons to question the ecological benefits
of preservation of 100 per cent of the woodland.
Discussion
The potential for better targeted policies The results of Table 6 show that restrictions on
woodland on moderate slopes impose higher costs to the landholder than restrictions on woodland on13
steep slopes –- for all the different kinds of woodland.  Ceteris paribus, the ecological benefits of
retaining woodland on steeper slopes are higher than retaining woodland on moderate slopes.  Taken
together, these two arguments suggest that
• some areas of low economic value have high ecological value, and
• some areas of high economic value have low ecological value.
On this basis, policies could be targeted to achieve given levels of preservation at least cost.  For
example, the former kind of area would be preserved first and the latter preserved last or perhaps not
at all.
The principles for payment The principle of payments to farmers for production of
environmental goods is well established in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. The principle of voluntary production of these goods, as opposed to mandatory
production, is also well established. The United Kingdom, for example, has preferred the voluntary
approach with payments and has avoided uncompensated regulations to preserve woodland. This is
quite different to the situation in New South Wales, which is in a sense, suprising. The legal practice
and cultural traditions in both countries vest property rights to the farmer over most services from the
farmer’s land. Following the practice in the OECD, any removal of those rights should be
compensated.
The overall trade-off   In the basic results of Table 3, the restrictions to stop clearing of
230 ha of woodland lead to an annual reduction in farm income of $2 439 ($33 952 –$31 513), or just
over $10 per preserved hectare.  The lump sum or present value of this annual amount is $125, over
20 years at 5 per cent.  The community, through the state government is placing a value of at least
$125 on every preserved hectare in imposing the restrictions on clearing.14
Appendix 1 A statistical description of linear programming.
As a mathematical technique, linear programming selects the combination of activities that
maximise profit, subject to resource constraints. The general model, with n  activities and m
constraints, can be written as follows after Chiang (1984, p.661-2).
Maximise p = c1x2 + c2x2 + ... + cnxn                                   (1)
Subject to a11x1 + a12x2 + ... + a1nxn {£,=,‡} r1
a21x1 + a22x2 + ... + a2nxn {£,=,‡}r2                 (2)
     :       :    :          :
       am1x1 + am2x2 + ... + amnxn {£,=,‡}rm




p = objective or profit function
cj = cost or price for activity j
Xj  = quantity of activity j
aij = technical coefficient for amount of constraint i used in activity j
ri = level of resource i available
Profit is defined as total gross margin per farm.  The gross margin per activity is the gross return
for the activity less the variable costs of production.  The gross margin for the farm is the sum of the
values for each activity.
The objective function (1) maximises the total gross margin associated with n activities by
determining the optimum levels for each of the choice variables Xj according to the associated cost or
price Cij. The values of Cij are constants and represent the gross margins associated with each activity.
The limit associated with resource i is represented by the constant ri in equations (2). The restriction
placed on Xj as represented by (3), ensures zero or positive production levels for each activity.15
Appendix 2 Details of the livestock enterprises, prices, and land types
The cattle production activity comprises a 100 head breeding herd, with a number of different
breeds, including Angus, Hereford x Angus and Devon x Hereford.  All of the calves (both steers and
heifers) are fattened for 90 to 100 days on improved pasture grown on the river flats. They are sold
when between 12 and 16 months of age, dependent on the season, market prices and their condition.
Each year, all the cows are pregnancy tested in December and culled, giving a calving percentage of
around 90 per cent. Approximately 14 cows are culled annually, including the ones not in calf, and
they are replaced by high quality heifers that are purchased privately. Also, one bull is culled for age
annually, to be replaced by a new one.
The wool is produced from a 1000 head wether flock, each of which cut approximately six
kilograms of wool per year, averaging 20.5 to 21 micron. The wethers originate predominantly from
the Egelabra bloodline and are normally run on some of the steeper country where they do well. They
are shorn in September, and the wool is sold at the October sale in Newcastle. These wethers are kept
for six years and 500 culled-for-age wethers are sold every three years and are replaced before the
next shearing.
The gross margins (GM) per livestock unit were calculated as the gross annual returns minus
variable costs.  They, and the maximum available operating capital, were as follows.
Good year Average year Poor year
Variable costs  $40 000 $35 000 $30 000
GM per cattle  $320  $247   $200
GM per sheep   $18    $11    $5
A dry sheep equivalent (DSE) is a term for the amount of energy required to maintain a 50 kg
wether (dry sheep) for a period of 12 months and so a 50 kg wether has a DSE rating of 1. The rating
was used to define the amount of energy required per livestock unit and the quantity of energy
supplied for each hectare of each land type.
The six land types may be described as follows.16
• River flats (40 ha): These are all planted to improved, introduced pastures that are very productive
and are spread with fortified sulphur fertiliser every year, at a rate of 250 kg/ha.
• Highly improved native pasture (120 ha): This country is predominantly native pasture and is
fertilised with fortified fertiliser at a rate of 125 kg/ha/yr. A kilogram of clover seed per hectare is
spread with the fertiliser.
• Improved native pasture (320 ha): This land is fertilised by air every three years (depending on
season and capital available) with single superphosphate at a rate of 150 kg/ha.
• Native pasture (50 ha): This land is relatively clear of timber and is entirely native grasses.
• Very steep/ rough country (50 ha): This country is too steep, too rocky and too rough to be cleared
or developed.
• Woodland (230 ha): The woodland comprises three kinds of eucalypts, namely white box, yellow
box and stringy bark although most of the trees are too small to be sold for milling. Each of these
three kinds of woodland occurs on moderate or steep slopes and the density of cover may be thick or
thin, so there are 12 woodland types in all.
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Table 1 Description of the enterprises
Enterprises Descriptions
Income earning
Sell yearling Sell 12-16 month old yearling
Sell wool Sell 6 kilograms of wool/sheep
Cost incurring
Graze flats Graze cows, calves, yearlings, and wethers
Graze highly improved native pasture “
Graze improved native pasture “
Graze native pasture “
Graze steep/rough country “
Graze timbered country “
Clear timbered country Clear and graze
Preserve timbered country Preserve, with no grazing
.18
Table 2 Description of the constraints
Constraint Description
Monetary ($)
Variable costs Operating capital available to cover variable costs
Capital costs Investment capital available for clearing and development
Land areas
Flats River flats planted to improved, introduced pastures
Highly-improved
 native pasture
Native pastures fertilised and seeded each year
Improved native
 pasture
Native pastures fertilised every 2-3 years
Native pasture Cleared country, native grasses
Steep/rough Country too steep and rough to clear or develop (rocks etc)
Woodland areas
WB - mod thick Moderately sloped country, thick cover of white box timber
WB - mod thin Moderately sloped country, thin cover of white box timber
WB - steep thick Steeply sloped country, thick cover of white box timber
WB - steep thin Steeply sloped country, thin cover of  white box timber
YB - mod thick Moderately sloped country, thick cover of yellow box timber
YB - mod thin Moderately sloped country, thin cover of yellow box timber
YB - steep thick Steeply sloped country, thick cover of yellow box timber
YB - steep thin Steeply sloped country, thin cover of  yellow box timber
SB - mod thick Moderately sloped country, thick cover of stringy bark timber
SB - mod thin Moderately sloped country, thin cover of stringy bark timber
SB - steep thick Steeply sloped country, thick cover of stringy bark timber
SB - steep thin Steeply sloped country, thin cover of  stringy bark timber19
Table 3 Basic results for six scenarios (no restrictions versus total






 per year ($)
No restrictions on
clearing
Good Year 1 312 131 56 960
Average year 1 157 116 33 952
Poor year 1001 100 18 960
Total restrictions on
clearing
Good year 1 263 126 53 371
Average year 1 116 112 31 513
Poor year 960 96 16 966
Table 4 Comparison of the effects of price changes and restrictions
  (annual gross margins $)
Scenarios Good year - sheep
Poor year - cattle
Good year - cattle
Poor year - sheep
Effect of
prices
No  restrictions 36 613 35 456 1 157
Total  restrictions 34 080 32 964 1 116
Effect of rest-
rictions
2 533 2 49220
Table 5 Gross margins and opportunity costs for different clearing restrictions
Scenarios Annual gross
margin        ($)
Opportunity
cost ($)
No clearing restrictions 33 952 0





 bark and yellow box
33 021 931
Restrict steep clearing 32 903 1 049
50 % clearing restrictions 32 781 1 171
75 % clearing restrictions 32 190 1 762
Total clearing restrictions 31513 2 439
Table 6 Marginal value products per land class assuming an average year




Flats (highly improved introduced pasture) 1439 1439
Highly improved native pasture 829 829
Improved native pasture 673 673
Native pasture 486 486
Steep slope/rough country 45 45
White box (mod. slope, thick) 430 168
White box (mod. slope, thin) 458 196
White box (steep slope, thick) 389 141
White box (steep slope, thin) 417 168
Yellow box (mod. slope, thick) 430 168
Yellow box (mod. slope, thin) 458 196
Yellow box (steep slope, thick) 389 141
Yellow box (steep slope, thin) 417 168
Stringy bark (mod. slope, thick) 430 168
Stringy bark (mod. slope, thin) 458 196
Stringy bark (steep slope, thick) 389 141
Stringy bark (steep slope, thin) 417 168